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Human learning is a complex phenomenon that requires adaptive processes across a range of
temporal and spacial scales. While our understanding of those processes at single scales has increased
exponentially over the last few years, a mechanistic understanding of the entire phenomenon has
remained elusive. We propose that progress has been stymied by the lack of a quantitative framework
that can account for the full range of neurophysiological and behavioral dynamics both across scales
in the systems and also across different types of learning. We posit that network neuroscience offers
promise in meeting this challenge. Built on the mathematical fields of complex systems science and
graph theory, network neuroscience embraces the interconnected and hierarchical nature of human
learning, offering insights into the emergent properties of adaptability. In this review, we discuss the
utility of network neuroscience as a tool to build a quantitative framework in which to study human
learning, which seeks to explain the full chain of events in the brain from sensory input to motor
output, being both biologically plausible and able to make predictions about how an intervention at
a single level of the chain may cause alterations in another level of the chain. We close by laying out
important remaining challenges in network neuroscience in explicitly bridging spatial scales at which
neurophysiological processes occur, and underscore the utility of such a quantitative framework for
education and therapy.
A TAXONOMY OF HUMAN LEARNING
In its simplest conceptualization, the nervous system
can be understood as a mapping device that selects mo-
tor commands in response to stimuli present in the world
[1]. The goal of this mapping is to optimize output be-
havior to ensure survival of the organism. However, the
complexity of the inputs makes the mapping far from
trivial: the state of the world is always changing, and
the number of possible states of the world is virtually in-
finite. It is precisely for that reason that evolution’s so-
lution to this problem does not involve an infinitely long
stimulus-response lookup table. Instead, it provides ani-
mals with the capacity to adapt and optimize the input-
output mappings in various temporal scales within a life
time, allowing animals to thrive in a highly complex and
ever-changing world. This adaptability – either an ac-
quisition or modification of behaviors in response to the
environment – is what we call learning [2]. Given its im-
portance in optimizing survival, learning is implemented
in the brain in a variety of ways, and so it is useful to
draw distinctions with regards to the mechanism of adap-
tation, to the content being learned, and to whether the
individual is aware of this process or not.
The process of learning always involves a learner, who
undergoes adaptation in stimulus-response mappings,
and the process may or may not involve an instructor.
The learner can be considered the individual as a whole,
or can be considered a subset of the nervous system such
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as a specific brain region or even a specific neuronal
population. The instructor, when it exists (“instructed
learning”), influences learning by providing qualitative
or quantitative information about the learning process
[3]. If the information provided is the correct input-
output mapping, learning is said to be “supervised” –
a term drawn from computer science [3, 4]. If the in-
struction is a feedback signal in the form of a binary fact
(i.e., right/wrong) or continuous reward (i.e., from bad
to good), the process is called “reinforcement learning”
[5]. Finally, if learning occurs without the presence of an
instructor, the process is called “unsupervised”, “non-
instructed”, or “discovery learning” [6]. The instructor –
like the learner – can be another individual (i.e., a teacher
or a guardian), or it can be a different part or signal in
the brain (e.g., dopamine which signals reward prediction
errors in the brain). The spectrum of supervised, to rein-
forcement, to unsupervised learning often coincides with
a spectrum of acquisition times, with instructed learning
(and in particular supervised learning) happening more
quickly than non-instructed, unsupervised learning.
Information about the state of the world arrives as in-
puts to the system, often through sensory organs. The
goal of the sensory systems in the brain is to faithfully re-
cover information about the local environment. However,
because a large amount of sensory information is con-
stantly bombarding the brain, humans are consciously
aware of only a few of these inputs at any given time. For
this reason, learning does not always happen as a con-
scious process (“explicit learning”), but can also occur
outside of awareness (“implicit learning”) [7]. And de-
spite the massive amount of information received through
our sensory organs, sensory information alone is rarely
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2sufficient to allow a complete inference about the state
of the world or the content of one’s surroundings. There-
fore, animals, and humans in particular, often rely on sta-
tistical relationships between sensory inputs over time to
infer unseen features of the external world that are criti-
cal for behavior. In “statistical learning”, the statistical
relationships between sensory stimuli allows perception
to infer or extrapolate information about the world [8, 9].
In humans, a particular type of sensory information
that carries significant representational content is lan-
guage. Indeed, language is widely used as an instruction
signal, allowing learning to take place even before any
behavior is executed (through supervised learning) [10].
This particular type of instructed learning, commonly
observed in education and psychotherapy [11], contrasts
with reinforcement learning, where the learner interacts
with an environment and receives feedback signals in a
process involving trial and error. Although education is
a very prevalent form of learning for children and adoles-
cents, reinforcement learning is still the primary means
by which humans and other animals without language
learn early in life [12].
But learning through reinforcement signals can be a
computationally daunting task: maximizing future re-
ward may require a long sequence of behaviors before any
type of feedback is received, leading to ambiguity on the
link between the feedback and the specific behaviors exe-
cuted. Indeed, because a very large number of actions are
possible at every moment, the number of complete poli-
cies (sequences of actions towards a goal) grows exponen-
tially with the number of actions, making the problem of
learning by trial-and-error quickly intractable. One solu-
tion to this problem, widely used in machine learning but
likely also by humans, is to combine actions together into
subroutines [13, 14] – for an action with positive valence
like brushing one’s teeth, one can combine the actions
grab toothbrush, put toothpaste, bring into mouth, and re-
peat the brushing movements several times, into a single
brush teeth action), reducing the computational complex-
ity of the reward maximization problem. This solution is
referred to as “hierarchical reinforcement learning” [15–
17].
IN NEED OF A QUANTITATIVE FRAMEWORK
As in any scientific field, separating the topic of study
into smaller categories makes the problem easier to ad-
dress. However, it is important that the individual cat-
egories of learning that we described above converge at
some point into a general description: one that offers a
fundamental understanding of behavior, the primary goal
of psychology and neuroscience. A major challenge ham-
pering progress towards such a description is the lack of
a quantitative framework that can account for the full
range of neurophysiological and behavioral data across
different types of learning. Such a framework would be
critical for understanding the manner in which sensory
information translates into the diversity and flexibility of
behavior observed in humans. In other words, a frame-
work that bridges different types of learning must bridge
different scales of neurophysiology. Moreover, such a
framework – which brides sensory information and ac-
tion – would enable the design of interventions to reshape
behavior according to individual needs. These interven-
tions could involve a combination of approaches ranging
from reward signals, instruction signals, implicit or ex-
plicit training, and certainly a good deal of self-discovery
on the part of the individual [18].
It is interesting to note that a quantitative framework
can become a quantitative theory of human learning, if
bolstered by appropriate physiological and physical intu-
itions and evidence. But to understand how a framework
can become a theory, let us consider exactly what such a
theory is not. First, a quantitative theory is not only a
quantitative description of data (of any sort), but instead
is a model that can be used to predict behavior. Second,
a quantitative theory must go beyond phenomenological
models that can predict behavior in a narrow range of en-
vironmental conditions but with no biological realism, as
this class of models cannot offer insights into true mech-
anisms. Third, such a theory should comprise more than
a specific subset of phenomena, perhaps useful for predic-
tion and biophysically realistic, but not covering the full
range of processes between stimuli and behavior. Indeed,
a quantitative theory of human learning must comprise
the entire chain of events in the brain from sensory input
to motor output, being both biologically plausible and
able to make predictions about how an intervention at a
single level of the chain may cause alterations in another
level of the chain.
There is an enormous appeal in obtaining such a the-
ory. From a behavioral perspective, it would allow an
understanding of how identical sensory stimuli may lead
to vastly different behavior in a single individual, de-
pending on its environmental conditions or phase of life.
The same theory may, in addition, account for variability
across individuals, taking into consideration the learning
environments and conditions that they differently expe-
rienced. From a neuroscientific perspective, it could pro-
vide a greater understanding of the physiological pro-
cesses that reshape information as it is transferred from
one layer of the nervous system to another [19]. From
an educational perspective, it could elucidate more ef-
fective teaching approaches leading students to conform
to social norms or learn educational material more effec-
tively [20]. And from a clinical perspective, it holds the
promise to reshape the way that interventions are made
so that behavior is implicitly and explicitly altered to
improve one’s day-to-day experiences [21]. Put simply,
such a theory could offer a principled empirical frame-
work in which to guide efforts in education, cognitive
and behavioral therapy, and clinical interventions for the
betterment of society.
3EXISTING THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
FRAMEWORKS
Clearly, the process of learning, by which behavior is
optimized in response to sensory information, is a com-
plex one, being implemented by the nervous system in a
variety of ways. If we isolate the organism in terms of its
input-output mapping device – the brain –, it becomes
clear that this mapping is far from trivial, involving nu-
merous intermediate brain regions situated conveniently
between sensory input and motor output areas. Some
of these intermediate regions are useful for quantifying
value [22, 23], others signal sensory predictions or pre-
diction errors [24], and even others represent the abstract
meaning of language [25]. For this reason, we argue, it
is not enough to isolate a single component of the sys-
tem when studying how it affects behavior. Instead, a
holistic view of learning must comprise interacting parts
and dynamics in its description, and must also culminate
in a description of how the individual parts reconfigure
specific patterns of neural activity in motor areas which,
in turn, drive behavior.
Despite such complexity, neuroscience research has,
historically, focused heavily on (i) relationships between
neural activity and sensory stimuli [26], or (ii) between
neural activity and behavior [27]. A better approach,
instead, should comprise the full set of relationships be-
tween parts to deal with how information is propagated
through the brain. And in the specific case of learn-
ing, one should focus on how these relationships change
over time, to enable changes in behavior. Understand-
ing how such a complex process such as learning unfolds
in time, therefore, is hardly feasible without a mathe-
matical framework that can quantify the interactions of
the individual parts and the orchestration of behavioral
adaptability [28].
Yet, because a description of the full set of processes
between sensory stimulation and behavior in terms of
molecular signaling or spike trains is hardly feasible, the
study of the neurophysiology of learning has historically
focused on subcomponents of the system. In effect, this
corresponds to a reassignment of the input-output lay-
ers to lower levels such as, for instance, presynaptic and
postsynaptic neurons. Indeed, this approach has been
successful in describing how learning shapes the com-
munication between individual neurons. Consider the
field of spike-timing dependent plasticity, which relates
changes in the efficiency of communication between neu-
rons in terms of relative spike timings [29]. If presynaptic
spikes occur just before postsynaptic spikes more often
than the reverse, synapses are strengthen (this process is
referred to as Hebbian learning). In contrast, if presy-
naptic spikes occur more often following postsynaptic
spikes, than synapses are weakened (anti-Hebbian learn-
ing). These rules are now ubiquitous in the study of the
neurophysiology of learning as they effectively describe
learning at the level of neurons. Still, to bridge this level
of description to the level of behavior, one must implicitly
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FIG. 1. Common statistical measures of network ar-
chitecture. Network architecture in complex systems can be
studied by extracting summary statistics that each measure a
different feature of that architecture. (A) Network centrality
is a notion of a node’s influence on the network. Perhaps the
most commonly studied centrality measure is degree centrality
which is simply the number (or strength) of edges emanating
from a node. The node with the highest degree centrality in
this graph is highlighted in peach, along with all of its edges.
High degree nodes are often referred to as hubs in the network.
(B) The clustering coefficient is a measure of local architec-
ture in a network, and is commonly estimated by determining
the ratio of the number of closed triangles (here highlighted
in yellow) to connected triples (here highlighted in peach).
The higher this ratio, the higher the clustering coefficient of
the network, and the greater the expected potential for local
processing. (C) The shortest pathlength between two nodes is
defined by the fewest number of edges that must be traversed
in order to get from the first node to the second node. The
shortest path between the first node (peach) and the second
node (yellow) is highlighted in blue; all other nodes and edges
not participating in the shortest path are represented in grey.
Networks with relatively short pathlenths on average between
all nodes in the network are thought to be efficient at trans-
mitting information globally throughout the system. (D) A
network is said to display community or modular structure if
it contains groups of nodes that are more densely intercon-
nected to one another than they are to other groups. In this
graph, there exists a peach module (left) and a yellow mod-
ule (right), in addition to two singletons (highlighted in blue
and green, respectively). Networks with community or mod-
ular structure are thought to effectively segregate processing
within the separate modules.
assume that by combining a series of individual synaptic
changes from sensory areas to motor areas, behavior is
ultimately reshaped.
Another quantitative model of the neurophysiology
of learning that considers feedback signals is reward-
dependent plasticity [30]. This model builds on spike-
4timing dependent plasticity, but proposes that the mag-
nitude of synaptic change is modulated by the pres-
ence of reward signals – commonly the neurotransmitter
dopamine. If this neurotransmitter – thought to signal a
reward prediction error – is present in the system, plas-
ticity is relatively more likely to happen then when it is
not present. Through reward-dependent plasticity, the
nervous system can be reshaped so that reward predic-
tion improves and prediction error decreases over time.
Again, this mechanistic description of learning is effec-
tive in capturing essential aspects of neuronal plasticity,
but falls short of describing the full set of interactions in
the brain that occur with learning.
One can also examine the effects of learning at larger
scales. Since the advent of neuroimaging, region-to-
region interactions can be quantified as statistical de-
pendencies between the blood-oxygen-level dependent
(BOLD) signals from two regions, enabling a large-scale
quantification of the effects of learning. These statisti-
cal dependencies are often referred to as estimates of so-
called functional connectivity [31], because of their poten-
tial relationship to inter-regional communication [32, 33].
For example, in a study of explicit learning, functional
connectivity was found to be higher between the medial-
temporal lobe and dorsolateral prefrontal or lateral occip-
ital cortices; in contrast, during implicit learning, func-
tional connectivity is more pronounced between the me-
dial temporal lobes and the thalamus [34]. Further il-
lustrating the potential for these approaches, it was ob-
served that, in a reinforcement learning paradigm, the
dorsal and ventral striatum are differentially functionally
connected to the areas near the substantia nigra and ven-
tral tegmental area, respectively [35]. These techniques,
therefore, allowed the researcher to determine how a sin-
gle brain area is interacting with a diverse set of other
regions, allowing one to infer their potential role in the
broader context of learning.
COMPLEX SYSTEMS SCIENCE: A USEFUL
FRAMEWORK FOR MULTISCALE
NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL PROCESSES
Yet, to get the full picture of input-output map-
pings, bridging across types of learning and individual
paradigms, one needs a holistic picture of brain function-
ing. Fortunately, a new field of science has emerged in
the last decade to describe how parts of a system give
rise to its collective behaviors [36]. The framework of
complex systems deals with systems that display emer-
gent behavior: behavior that cannot be explained by the
dynamics of individual system components, but instead
arises from a complex pattern of interactions between the
parts.
To take a concrete example in the brain, while many
sensorimotor, subcortical, and frontal regions change
their activity as someone learns a new motor skill [37],
none of these changes – by themselves – could lead to
learning. Instead, changes in the processing performed
by one brain region can alter the processing that is per-
formed in other brain regions. As these alterations build
on one another, a pattern of interactions across the brain
can emerge, enabling a change in behavior [38, 39]. While
a comprehensible account of the collective changes in
terms of individual interactions may appear daunting,
one can turn to the mathematics of complex systems to
obtain a qualitative and quantitative understanding of
the system at various levels of description.
Complex systems science is a relatively broad disci-
pline, and not all of its tools are necessarily relevant for
understanding the brain. However, a particular subdisci-
pline known as network science does appear particularly
relevant because it offers a mathematical framework to
characterize systems composed of heterogeneously inter-
acting parts (Fig. 1). Built on the mathematical field of
graph theory, network science has previously been used
to describe properties of social networks [40, 41]. Due to
its general formulation, however, the majority of its tech-
niques have been extended to describe systems as varied
as smart-phone networks [42, 43], granular materials [44–
46], microbial communities [47, 48], or genetic expression
[49, 50].
The application of network science to study the brain
typically entails a parcellation of the brain into a set
of regions that display roughly independent structure or
function (Fig. 2A). The relationship between these re-
gions can then be characterized based on structure (i.e.
physical connections) or function (i.e. statistical rela-
tionships between regional timecourses) (Fig. 2B). Math-
ematically, regions of the brain are defined as the nodes
of a graph, and their relationship as edges connecting the
corresponding nodes (Fig. 2C). A graph with n nodes can
be represented as an n× n adjacency matrix Aij , whose
element aij corresponds to the connection strength be-
tween node i and node j. Once the adjacency matrix of
a graph is defined, one can then draw on techniques from
graph theory and network science to extract emerging
properties of the system [51, 52].
One of the main advantages of the network science ap-
proach in neuroscience lies in its ability to detect struc-
tures at the mesoscale level – encompassing subsets of
network nodes [53, 54]. One of the most important
emerging network properties at the mesoscale level is
community or modular structure [55]. A community (or
module) is defined as a subset of nodes from the graph
that are more tightly connected to each other than they
are to the rest of the network. Many real networks ex-
hibit some degree of community structure. In the brain,
interestingly, these clusters display beautiful overlap with
known cognitive systems, including motor, visual, audi-
tory, default mode, salience, attention, executive, and
subcortical systems [56–60]. Importantly, these modules
are differentially expressed, and show different patterns
of interaction with one another while a human is learning
[61].
Identifying the community structure of a network is a
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FIG. 2. Network and multilayer network representations of the brain. (A) A brain graph or network. (B) The
two fundamental units of the brain graph are nodes (brain regions) and edges (functional or structural relationships or links
between nodes). (C) Together, the pattern of edges interconnecting nodes forms a graph or network, from which we can extract
meaningful patterns, principles, and predictions. (D) In many adaptive processes, complex networked systems like the brain
display patterns of interconnectivity that change over time. Particularly in learning, functional brain networks reconfigure
as behavior changes. To address this temporal complexity, multilayer networks represent a brain network estimated over a
particular time window as a single layer inside of a larger system. Networks in one layer are explicitly linked to networks
in the preceding layer and the immediate future layer by so-called identity links. These identity links enable the network to
be studied as a single entity, rather than an ensemble, significantly simplifying the mathematics and remaining true to the
inherent dependencies between time windows (layers). Multilayer networks can be used to represent time-varying connectivity
patterns in the brain as someone learns, and such applications have uncovered non-trivial reconfigurations of functional modules
supporting learning.
complex problem, though, and most of the current ap-
proaches rely on heuristic algorithms to address an NP-
complete problem. A particularly successful technique
is the optimization of the modularity quality function,
which involves partitioning network nodes into modules
(or communities) such that the total connection strength
within groups of the partition is more than would be
expected in random networks of similar kind [62]. The
complexity of the approach resides in the fact that each
partition needs to be tested in a brute-force manner.
While this approach may at first seem too abstract and
simplistic, it captures exactly what have been listed as
desirable features of a quantitative framework of learning:
a holistic description of region-to-region interactions en-
compassing the whole brain, applicable across tasks and
experimental paradigms, allowing one to identify emerg-
ing properties and features in a quantitative manner.
Indeed, it is precisely the simplicity and generality of
this approach that makes it so powerful, and its useful-
ness is evident from the vast number of insights brought
by this burgeoning field now termed ”Network Neuro-
science” [63–66].
NETWORK NEUROSCIENCE AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN LEARNING
A single network can assume different forms over time
or across different conditions. For example, a network of
friends can evolve over time, a network of blogs can be
different in periods of election or in times of major sports
events, and a network of brain regions can assume differ-
ent forms before and after the acquisition of a new skill.
In all cases, the interpretation of each condition or time
point as a separate network obscures the fact that some
nodes or edges have the same identity across networks.
Multilayer networks can account for this emerging struc-
ture by assuming that nodes or edges can change across
conditions or time, while still maintaining their identity
[67]. In these cases, a multilayer network with n nodes
and p layers can be represented as an n × n × p tensor
Aijs, where element aijs corresponds to the connection
strength between node i and node j in layer (or slice) s
[68].
The application of network neuroscience to the study
of human learning, in particular, benefits greatly from
6the mathematical formulation of multilayer networks [69]
(Fig. 2D). For a given set of nodes, if their relationships
– network edges – are measured at different points in
time while learning unfolds, the corresponding multilayer
network can capture the reconfigurations that the entire
brain undergoes. This approach has been widely suc-
cessful, in particular, in the case of functional networks,
which are sensitive enough to variations on the timescale
of a single experiment. These graphs can be extracted
during task performance on a single day [70–72] or across
many days in longitudinal study designs [61, 69].
A particularly interesting development in network neu-
roscience was the observation that several network met-
rics seem to change with learning [69]. In particular in the
context of motor skill learning, the connection strengths
seem to increase as well as the average clustering coeffi-
cient, along with reduced communication distances and
altered network centrality [73, 74] (for a careful descrip-
tion of these statistics, see [75]). The joint increase of
connection strengths and clustering seem to suggest that
the network architecture becomes more modular with
learning – a proposition that has received recent empiri-
cal support [76].
A B
FIG. 3. The brain exhibits a hierarchical structure,
where smaller units combine in groups and then into
increasingly larger units. (A) In the network formulation,
nodes and edges at the lowest levels combine into cohesive
units that achieve some form of computation. These units, in
turn, can be similarly thought of as nodes, with correspond-
ing edges representing interactions with similarly sized units
that similarly perform some computation. This hierarchical
structure can be conceived at many distinct levels according
to the computations considered. (B) Each level of the hierar-
chy can also be thought of in biological terms. At the lowest
level, nodes can represent individual neurons and edges the
corresponding synapses. At higher levels, nodes can represent
circuits or even entire brain regions that perform a meaningful
form of computation.
But how can one detect time-varying modular struc-
ture in multilayer networks? The basic approach con-
sists of deriving an expanded single-layer network derived
from the multilayer network by connecting each node to
itself across layers. In time-evolving networks, this is
done by connecting each node to itself across layers corre-
sponding to adjacent time-points. In multislice networks,
this is achieved by connecting each node to itself in all
layers corresponding to different events or conditions [77].
Communities in multilayer networks can then be detected
by optimizing the modularity quality function with the
expanded (np × np) adjacency matrix. While a compu-
tationally challenging task [78], identifying communities
in multilayer networks derived from neuroimaging data
has proven particularly useful in the study of motor skill
learning, where motor and visual modules become in-
creasingly autonomous from one another with practice,
as regions known to affect cognitive control release from
the remainder of the network [61].
Once the community structure of a network is deter-
mined, several other network metrics can be defined [25].
For instance, insights into the role of individual nodes of
the network can be obtained by calculating the fraction
of its connections (or the fraction of the edge weights)
that connect it to nodes within or between communities
[79]. For multilayer networks specifically, the module al-
legiance of a network summarizes the co-occurrence of
network nodes in communities across layers such as in-
dividuals or experimental conditions [61, 72]. Similarly,
the flexibility of a given brain region can be quantified
as the number of times it changes community affiliation.
Interestingly, individual differences in this flexibility of
modular architecture predicts future learning rate in a
motor-skill learning task [69].
Overall, there is increasing evidence that modularity
is intimately linked to learning. While the specific areas
that display increased modularity with learning change
from task to task, the increased organization of the net-
work into distinct and roughly independent compart-
ments seems to be a ubiquitous finding. While a rela-
tively new finding in the context of brain network ar-
chitecture and human learning, the relationship between
modularity and adaptability is one that has been touted
as fairly fundmental in many other disciplines [80, 81].
In the context of the brain, modularity – and partic-
ularly flexible changes in brain network organization –
may enable learning by enhancing memory [71, 82] and
other dimensions of executive function including cogni-
tive flexibility [71].
A QUANTITATIVE FRAMEWORK WILL
ENGAGE MULTISCALE NETWORK
NEUROSCIENCE
At this point, it is worthwhile to look back at the de-
sirable features of a quantitative theory for learning and
re-evaluate where we stand in its achievement. As stated
previously, it should comprise a quantitative description
of the interactions among system components, encom-
7passing the entire chain of events in the brain from sen-
sory input to motor output – that is, behavior [83]. More-
over, it should detect emergent properties of the brain at
multiple hierarchical levels and account for the variety
of results obtained from different types of learning with
a single framework. Taken together, it is clear that the
framework of network neuroscience seems, indeed, to be
a great candidate for achieving such a theory. Yet, be-
ing a candidate to achieve a theory is not the same as
explicitly being the theory itself.
Indeed, considering that we are still not able to de-
sign effective educational and therapeutic interventions
based on the network neuroscience of learning, we must
assume that we do not have a quantitative theory of hu-
man learning. It is worthwhile, therefore, to take a step
back and evaluate our current approaches in light of our
current understanding and ask if we have at least at-
tained an appropriate quantitative framework. An ap-
propriate framework is one that can bridge levels of de-
scription from neural processes to human behavior. Can
network neuroscience – as an approach – be this bridge
[66]? Some argue that the approach in its current instan-
tiation is incomplete or insufficient for a neurobiological
description of human behavior. Indeed, critics point to
the fact that network nodes are often ill-defined, group-
ing regions with a variety of structural and functional
properties into a single chunk. Similarly, collapsing the
diversity of interactions as an edge within a single dimen-
sion of variability may, at first, appear too simplistic. Are
there ways to extend network neuroscience to meet these
challenges?
Recent mathematical advances, methodological devel-
opments, and empirical evidence suggests that this is in-
deed the case. Network neuroscience in principle can be
extended to any spatial scale of relational data, but even
more importantly, can be used to simultaneously model
multiple scales, and indeed to link the network represen-
tation in one scale to that in another. While these tools
still simplify the full richness of the brain’s structure and
function into a graphical framework, they nevertheless
directly address the repeated, hierarchical nature of the
brain, thereby potentially providing the desired holistic
description. And perhaps even these simplifications are
important. From a philosophical perspective, to bridge
between levels of description, one needs to abstract away
the details of each particular level and identify the com-
monalities between them – requiring an abstract notion
of units (e.g. nodes) and their interactions (e.g. edges)
(Fig. 3).
Bridging between levels of description, we believe,
is precisely what is missing in the current frameworks
[66]. Just like a whole-brain description at the regional
level allows the observation of emerging structure at the
mesoscale level, we can infer that descriptions at different
levels may allow the detection of emerging structures of
different kinds. Consider the field of neurophysiology, for
example, widely successful in describing the biophysics
of neurons and their plasticity with learning. Bridging
the gap between neuronal-level descriptions and larger-
scale, region-to-region interactions, would bring decades
of research in neurophysiology in contact with recent dis-
coveries in network neuroscience [84], allowing a connec-
tion between sensory input and behavioral output at var-
ious levels of description. And, we propose, the language
of network neuroscience may be the perfect language to
bridge this gap.
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